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Abstract
In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev-
Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev-
Yao attackers have been shown to be reducible to models with one Dolev-Yao at-
tacker. In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach and investigate
the case of multiple non-collaborating attackers. After formalizing the framework
for multi-attacker scenarios, we show with a case study that concurrent competi-
tive attacks can interfere with each other. We then present a new strategy to defend
security protocols, based on active exploitation of attack interference. The paper
can be seen as providing two proof-of-concept results: (i) it is possible to exploit
interference to mitigate protocol vulnerabilities, thus providing a form of protec-
tion to protocols; (ii) the search for defense strategies requires scenarios with at
least two attackers.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context and motivations
The typical attacker model adopted in security protocol analysis is the one of [16]:
the Dolev-Yao (DY) attacker can compose, send and intercept messages at will, but,
following the perfect cryptography assumption, he cannot break cryptography. The DY
attacker is thus in complete control of the network — in fact, he is often formalized as
being the network itself — and, with respect to network abilities, he is actually stronger
than any attacker that can be implemented in real-life situations. Hence, if a protocol is
proved to be secure under the DY attacker, it will also withstand attacks carried out by
less powerful attackers; aside from deviations from the specification introduced in the
implementation phase, the protocol can thus be safely employed in real-life networks,
at least in principle.
Alternative attacker models have also been considered. On the one hand, computa-
tional models for protocol analysis consider attackers who can indeed break cryptog-
raphy, as opposed to the symbolic models where cryptography is perfect (as we will
assume in this paper). See, for instance, [1] for a survey of models and proofs of proto-
col security, and [6] for a protocol-security hierarchy in which protocols are classified
by their relative strength against different forms of attacker compromise.
On the other hand, different symbolic models have been recently proposed that con-
sider multiple attackers instead of following the usual practice to consider a single DY
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attacker, a choice that is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating
DY attackers have been shown to be reducible to models with one DY attacker (see,
e.g., [10] for a detailed proof, as well as [4, 14, 21] for general results on the reduction
of the number of agents to be considered). For instance, [5, 20] extend the DY model to
account for network topology, transmission delays, and node positions in the analysis
of real-world security protocols, in particular for wireless networks. This results in a
distributed attacker, or actually multiple distributed attackers, with restricted, but more
realistic, communication capabilities than those of the standard DY attacker.
Multiple attackers are also considered in the models of [2, 3, 7, 8], where each pro-
tocol participant is allowed to behave maliciously and intercept and forge messages. In
fact, each agent may behave as a DY attacker, without colluding nor sharing knowl-
edge with anyone else. The analysis of security protocols under this multi-attacker
model allows one to consider scenarios of agents competing with each other for per-
sonal profit. Agents in this model may also carry out retaliation attacks, where an
attack is followed by a counterattack, and anticipation attacks, where an agent’s attack
is anticipated, before its termination, by another attack by some other agent.
The features of the models of [5, 20] and of [2, 3, 7, 8] rule out the applicability
of the n-to-1 reducibility result for the DY attacker, as the attackers do not necessarily
collaborate, and might actually possess different knowledge to launch their attacks.
They might even attack each other. In fact, retaliation and anticipation allow protocols
to cope with their own vulnerabilities, rather than eradicating them. This is possible
because agents are capable of doing more than just executing the steps prescribed by
a protocol: they can decide to anticipate an attack, or to counter-attack by acting even
after the end of a protocol run (in which they have been attacked). Still, retaliation
may nevertheless be too weak as honest agents can retaliate only after an attack has
succeeded, and cannot defend the protocol during the attack itself.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach: we show that multiple non-
collaborating DY attackers may interfere with each other in such a manner that it is
possible to exploit interference to mitigate protocol vulnerabilities, thus providing a
form of protection to flawed protocols.
To investigate the non-cooperation between attackers, we propose a (protocol-inde-
pendent) model in which: (i) a protocol is run in the presence of multiple attackers,
and (ii) attackers potentially have different capabilities, different knowledge and can
interfere with each other. This, ultimately, allows us to create a benign attacker for
the system defense: agents can rely on a network guardian, an ad-hoc agent whose
task is diminishing the frequency with which dishonest agents can succeed in attacking
vulnerable protocols. This methodology moves the focus from an attack-based view of
security to a defense-based view.
In other words, in the approach we propose, instead of looking for attacks and
reacting to the existence of one by redesigning the vulnerable protocol, we look for
strategies for defending against existing known attacks. We would be performing pro-
tocol analysis to identify possible defenses, rather than attacks.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we formalize models for the network and the
agents, including, in particular, agent attitude, goals, and disposition. We then consider
in Section 3 a vulnerable protocol from [9] as a case study and focus on the interactions
between attack procedures that cannot be observed in classical settings. In Section 4,
we explain how interference between attacks leads to a methodology that can be used
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for defending weak (vulnerable) protocols against attacks. In Section 5, we conclude by
discussing our approach and current and future work. Appendix A provides additional
details about the case study; a second case study is explored in appendix B.
2 System models: network, agents, attitude
2.1 Goals of modeling and approach
Network models for security protocol analysis typically either replace the commu-
nication channel with a single attacker or build dedicated channels for each attacker
(e.g. [4, 10, 15, 17, 21]). Traditional modeling strategies are not adequate to describe
the non-collaborative scenario under consideration. The main shortcoming is the fact
that the ability to spy the communication on a particular channel is hard-wired in the
network model and may depend critically on network topology or attacker identity;
the result is that an information-sharing mechanism (or a partial prohibition for it) is
structurally encoded in the network. We would like, instead, to (i) abstract from po-
sitional advantages and focus solely on how attackers interfere by attacking; (ii) treat
information-sharing (also as a result of spying) as a strategic choice of the agents.
For simplicity, in this paper we restrict our attention to two non-collaborative at-
tackers (E1 and E2), in addition to the two honest agents A and B and a trusted third-
party server S, whose presence is required by the protocol under consideration. In the
following, let Eves= {E1,E2} be the set of attackers and Agents= {A,B,E1,E2} the set
of all network agents (honest and dishonest, server excluded). Let X , Y , Z and W be
variables varying in Agents and E a variable in Eves; j takes value in {1,2}, whereas
i ∈N is reserved for indexing states.
We are aware that, in situations with more than two (dis)honest agents, further types
of interactions can arise; however, a full comprehension of the interactions depends
on building a clear picture of interference. Such a picture necessarily starts with the
elementary interaction between two attackers.
In order to focus on the raw interference between two attackers, both directing
their attack towards the same target, it is important for all attackers to have access to
the same view of what is taking place with honest agents and possibly different views
of what is taking place with the other attacker(s). If attackers do not all have the same
information, it is possible to conceive of strategies in which some attackers can be
mislead by others on purpose.
If the knowledge1 available to an attacker affects his view of the system, attacker
capabilities and effectiveness can be diversified, without needing to construct asym-
metric attackers or hardwire constraints that may hold for some attackers and not for
others. We find it relevant that a network model for non-collaborative scenarios —
besides reflecting this stance — also support a form of competition for access to mes-
sages, especially if attacks rely on erasing messages.
If it is possible in principle to actively interfere with an attack, it should be possible
to do so even if all attackers have the same knowledge. However, differentiating attack-
ers with respect to their understanding of the situation — in particular with respect to
awareness of other attackers — may bring into focus the conditions, if any, that allow
an attacker to interfere with another without being interfered with.
1Note that we do not attach any epistemic interpretation to the knowledge we consider in this paper we
simply consider the information initially available to the agents, together with the information they acquire
during protocol executions.
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We diversify the activity of our attackers by admitting that attackers may choose
to selectively ignore some messages, on the basis of the sender’s and receiver’s iden-
tifiers. This choice reflects actual situations in which attackers pay attention to only a
subset of the traffic through a network, focusing on the activity of some agents of inter-
est. Regardless of whether this selection is caused by computational constraints or by
actual interest, real attackers filter messages on the basis of the sender’s or receiver’s
identity. In the following, we will use the set AttendE to model the agents to which
attacker E is attentive; the predicate ofInterestE(X) (see Table 1) models the decisional
process of attacker E as he considers whether he wishes to augment AttendE with X ,
i.e. ofInterestE(X) implies that X is added into AttendE .
Honest agents are interested in security properties (such as authentication or se-
crecy) being upheld through the use of protocols. Dishonest agents, on the other hand,
are interested in changing or negating such properties.
The characteristic feature of the attackers we consider is their attitude. In particular,
in the case study that we consider in the next section, dishonest agents wish to attack
the security protocol and are ready, should they encounter unforeseen interference, to
take countermeasures with respect to the interference as well. In a sense, each attacker
is exclusively focused on attacking the protocol and becomes aware of other attackers
through their effect on his success.
Our target is capturing the behavior of equal-opportunity dishonest agents that do
not cooperate in the classical sense. By equal-opportunity attackers we mean agents
that have the same attack power and that differ with respect to the information content
of their knowledge bases. Such differentiation arises out of attentional choices and not
out of intrinsic constraints. Strategic and attitude considerations should not be derivable
explicitly from the attacker model — rather, they should configure it.
The driving hypothesis of our work is that studying non-collaboration requires a
complex notion of attacker, whose full specification involves attentional choices, deci-
sional processes pertaining to the network environment and to other agents, cooperation-
related choices and decisional processes pertaining to the attack strategy. To support
this type of attacker, we extend the usual notions of protocol and role by introducing a
control — a mechanism to regulate the execution of the steps prescribed by the attack
trace in accordance with the attacker’s strategy. In our model, honest agents perform a
controlled execution of the protocol as well, so as to support in-protocol detection of
attacks. Honest agents behave according to the protocol’s prescription, expect things
to go exactly in accordance with the protocol and interpret deviations in terms of the
activity of dishonest agents.
2.2 Agent model
Agent knowledge is characterized in terms of a proprietary dataset. To each X in
Agents, we associate the dataset DX , which we assume to be monotonically non-
decreasing. Our agents, in particular dishonest agents, collect information but do not
forget it. When it is important to highlight that the dataset is to be considered at a
particular moment, we will use DiX instead.
The network net is also formalized through a dataset, which is named Dnet and
indexed in the same manner as DiX . A dataset is a simple network model that can
be configured to support complex attackers; we believe it can successfully meet all
of our modeling requirements for non-collaboration. We postpone to Section 2.3 the
discussion of how datasets evolve and how indexing and evolution are related to actions
and message transmission.
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m1 ∈ DiE m2 ∈ DiE
(m1,m2) ∈ DiE
(Comp) m ∈ D
i
E k ∈ DiE
{m}k ∈ DiE
(Encr)
(m1,m2) ∈ DiE
m j ∈ DiE for j ∈ {1,2}
(Proj) {m}k ∈ D
i
E k−1 ∈ DiE
m ∈ DiE
(Decr)
< X ,m,Y >∈ Dinet sender(< X ,m,Y >) ∈ DiE Y ∈ DiE ψ
m ∈ Di+1E
(Restricted-Spy)
< X ,m,Y >∈ Dinet ofInterestE(X) Y ∈ DiE ψ
m ∈ Di+1E ∧ sender(< X ,m,Y >) ∈ Di+1E
(Inflow-Spy)
< X ,m,Y >∈ Dinet sender(< X ,m,Y >) ∈ DiE ofInterestE(Y) ψ
m ∈ Di+1E ∧Y ∈ Di+1E
(Outflow-Spy)
where ψ = E ∈canSee(< X,m,Y >, i)
m ∈ DiE X ∈ DiE Y ∈ DiE
< E(X),m,Y >∈ Di+1net
(Injection)
< X ,m,Y >∈ Dinet sender(< X ,m,Y >) ∈ DiE
< X ,m,Y >/∈ Di+1net
(Erase)
sender(< X ,m,Y >) =
{
E if there exists Z such that X = E(Z)
X otherwise
(True-sender-ID)
ofInterestE(X) =
{
true if E decides to pay attention to X
f alse otherwise (DecisionalProcess)
canSee(< X,m,Y >, i) = {Z ∈ Eves | Z can spy < X ,m,Y > on Dinet} (NetHandler)
Table 1: Dolev-Yao attacker model for non-collaborative scenarios: internal operations (synthe-
sis and analysis of messages), network operations (spy, inject, erase) and system configuration
(True-Sender-ID, DecisionalProcess, NetHandler). NetHandler describes the set of attackers
who are allowed to spy by applying one of the spy rules. We omit the usual rules for conjunc-
tion. The rules employed in the case study are marked in boldface.
We adapt the notion of DY attacker [16] to capture a non-collaborative scenario.
We show in Table 1 how one such attacker is formalized within our model, writing rules
for attacker E with respect to the knowledge base DE and the network model Dnet . Let
us specify that the rules in Table 1 are transition rules, rather than deduction rules.
Taken altogether, they construct a transition system – which describes a computation
by describing the states that are upheld as a result of the transition. We do not intend
to carry out in this paper logical inference to identify defenses against attacks; rather,
we recognize in the system’s evolution what in our eyes corresponds to a defense.
Attackers are legitimate network agents that can send and receive messages, de-
rive new messages by analyzing (e.g. decomposing) known messages, obtain messages
transiting on the network (spy) and remove them so that they do not reach their in-
tended receiver (erase). Attackers can also partially impersonate other agents, by in-
jecting messages under a false identity; we represent impersonification with the no-
tation E(X), where E is the impersonator and X is the identifier of the impersonated
agent. This set of abilities describes agents who have control over almost all facets of a
communication; their characteristic limitation is that they cannot violate cryptography
(we assume perfect cryptography). Note that further rules could be added in Table 1
for other forms of encryption, digital signatures, hashing, creation of nonces and other
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fresh data, and so on.
The most significant feature concerns spying, represented through three rules. For
conceptual clarity, we explicitly pair an erase-rule with the injection-rule, to emphasize
that an attacker can modify messages (by erasing them and injecting a substitute) or
send messages under a false identity (partial impersonification). Our attackers can
employ three different spy rules, adapted to formalize the fact that attackers do not pay
attention to all of the traffic on the network. The spy rules rely on an interpretation for
“send” that is modified with respect to the denotational semantics in [11], to reflect the
attentional focus of attackers. The default spy is the Restricted-Spy: only the messages
involving known agents in both sender and receiver roles, regardless of hypotheses on
their honesty, become part of the attacker’s dataset. Note that in our model what matters
is the actual sender and not the declared sender (True-Sender-ID). This mechanism
prevents total impersonification and allows filtering messages on the basis of the agent’s
attentional choices.
The attentional filter we use is meant as a choice of the agents and not as a constraint
to which they are subject; therefore, it must be possible to expand the set of agents of
interest. This role is fulfilled by the two exploratory spy rules in Table 1, Inflow-Spy and
Outflow-Spy. Attackers have the option of accepting or rejecting the newly discovered
identifier X , on the basis of the predicate ofInterestE(X), which models the decisional
process for attention.
Note that an attacker cannot apply any of the spy rules to obtain the message m
without knowing the identifier of at least one between m’s sender and m’s intended re-
ceiver. By not providing a “generalized spy” rule to waive this requirement, we ensure
that (D0E ∩ Agents = /0) implies that for all i, (DiE ∩ Agents = /0). Although E can aug-
ment its knowledge base DE indefinitely — through internal message generation and
the synthesis rules Comp and Encr —, E’s network activity is in fact null. One such E is
a dummy attacker, whose usefulness becomes apparent when considering that proof of
reductions for non-collaboration can involve progressively migrating identifiers from
an attacker’s dataset, until the attacker himself reduces to the dummy attacker.
An attacker’s dataset DE consists of (i) messages that have transited through the
network and that have been successfully received, analyzed or spied and (ii) identifiers
of the agents to whom the attacker is attentive. The set AttendE of identifiers of interest
to E is further partitioned into three sets: the set HE of agents believed2 to be honest,
the set AE of agents believed to be attackers, and the set UE of agents whose attitude
is unknown in E’s eyes. Note that differently from Dnet , agent datasets do not contain
triplets (〈sender-ID,message,receiver-ID〉), but only messages or identifiers.
Once a new identifier X enters the knowledge base of attacker E , E establishes a
belief about the honesty of X and places the identifier in one of the sets HE , AE or
UE . We do not enter details on how the agents initially build their knowledge base and
establish their belief about the attitude of other known agents. In fact, this classification
is meant to be dynamic. Agents are on the watch for suspicious messages, which
may indicate that an attack is ongoing or may reveal that a certain agent is dishonest.
Dynamically adapting their beliefs about the honesty of other agents allows the agents
to gather important information during single protocol runs. The agents we wish to
consider are smart: they always employ the available strategic information.
Attackers do not have automatic access to triplets that relate sender, message and
receiver. They must infer key pieces of information on the basis of the identifiers of the
agents to which they are attentive, and attempt to relate the identifiers to the messages
2We do not attach any doxastic interpretation to the beliefs we consider in this paper.
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they spy. Inference is easier if attackers use only the Restricted-Spy rule and keep the
set of known agents small. The difficulty of inference rises with the number of attackers
in the set AttendE .
2.3 Network model
All the operations that can change the state of the network dataset Dnet (send, receive,
inject and erase) are termed actions, whereas we consider spy simply as an operation:
although it requires interacting with the network, it does not change its state. Messages
in transit are inserted in the network dataset Dnet , where attackers can spy them before
they are delivered to their intended receivers. Contextually to delivery, the message
is removed from the dataset. Messages transit on the network dataset in the form of
triplets of the type 〈sender-ID,message,receiver-ID〉. As a consequence of message
delivery or deletion, Dnet is non-monotonic by construction.
The sequence of actions that takes place during a protocol run is enumerated and
used to index the evolution of the network dataset Dnet ; the index of Dinet is shared with
all the proprietary datasets DiX , whose states are synchronized accordingly. Dinet is the
state of the network dataset after the i-th action.
Customarily, evolutions are indexed per transition (per rule application), rather than
per action. Our chosen indexing strategy reflects three needs: (1) allowing agents to
fully analyze newly acquired messages without having to keep track of the number of
internal operations performed; (2) supporting a form of competition between attackers
for access to the network; (3) supporting a form of concurrence.
Ideally, all attackers act concurrently. However, the state transitions for the network
must be well-defined at all times, even if attackers try to perform conflicting actions,
such as spying and deleting the same message in transit. To impose a measure of
order, we introduce a network handler, whose task is to regulate the selection of the
next action and implement the dependencies between selected action and knowledge
available to each attacker; through the network handler, it is also possible to keep
the system evolution in accordance with additional constraints, modeling for example
information sharing within specific subsets of agents and network topology.
As soon as the state of the network changes (e.g. as a result of inject or send), the
network handler passes the new triplet to each attacker, who then simulates spying and
decides on whether to request erasing the message or injecting a new one as a conse-
quence, in accordance with his strategy. The network handler interprets the application
of the spy-rules, the inject-rule and the erase-rule as requests and selects the next action
from the set of requests. Message deletion, when requested by any attacker, is always
successful.
The outcome of the process governed by the network handler is described through
the function canSee(), which returns a subset of Eves, highlighting the identifiers of
the attackers who can spy “before” the message is erased from Dnet . The set of agents
described by canSee() contains at least the identifier of the attacker whose erase request
was served.
If the network handler does not receive any erase-requests, all attentive attackers
can acquire the message. If one or more erase-requests are present, the network handler
erases the message and confirms success in spying only for a subset of attentive attack-
ers. If an attacker is not in canSee(), the prior (simulated) spy is subject to rollback,
along with all internal operations that have occurred since the last confirmed action. If
no requests are received from attackers, the network handler oversees message delivery
or selects actions requested by honest agents.
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(i+ 1)th action Formalization
X → Y : m m ∈ DiX and Y ∈ DiX
< X ,m,Y >∈ Di+1net and < X ,m,Y > 6∈ Di+2net
m 6∈ Di+2W , where W 6∈ canSee(< X,m,Y >, i+1)
m ∈ Di+2Y
E(X)→ Y : m m ∈ DiE and X ∈ DiE and Y ∈ DiE
< E(X),m,Y >∈ Di+1net and < E(X),m,Y > 6∈ Di+2net
m 6∈ Di+2W , where W 6∈ canSee(< X,m,Y >, i+1)
m ∈ Di+2Y
X → EI(Y ) : m m ∈ DiX and Y ∈ DiX
< X ,m,Y >∈ Di+1net and < X ,m,Y > 6∈ Di+2net
m ∈ Di+2W , where W ∈ I and I ⊆ canSee(< X,m,Y >, i+1)
Table 2: Representation of operations in Alice&Bob notation.
Although the formulation of canSee() in terms of access time is intuitive, the reason
why we favor this mechanism is that time-dependent accessibility is not the only situa-
tion it can model. The function can be instantiated to model strategic decision-making
and information-sharing, or to capture a particular network topology. In realistic attack
scenarios, knowledge of a message that has been erased may depend more on coopera-
tion and information-sharing than on timing. For example, if E j is sharing information
with Ek (but not viceversa), whenever E j’s erase requests are served Ek is automatically
in canSee().
The network handler is not an intelligent agent. Specifying its behavior and instan-
tiating the function canSee() corresponds to configuring the particular network envi-
ronment in which the agents are immersed (i.e. canSee() is a configurable parameter
of our model).
As a result on the network handler and of our chosen indexing strategy, several in-
ternal operations can occur in a proprietary dataset between consecutive states, whereas
only a single action separates consecutive states of the network dataset. Attackers de-
termine the next state of the network dataset with priority with respect to the actions of
honest agents.
In Table 2, we formalize within our model operations in the Alice&Bob notation
used in Section 3; we write EI(Y ) to denote the subset of Eves who spy message m
addressed to Y , at least one of which has requested m to be erased.
With reference to Table 2, note that the (i+ 1)th action is requested when the state
of the network is Dinet and agent datasets are DiX ; thus, the sender X must already
know in DiX both the message m and the identifier of the intended recipient Y . The
message correctly transits on Di+1net , immediately after being sent. The (i+2)th action
is either receive (first two cases) or erase (last case). the availability of m to attackers
is conclusively decided after the network handler selects the (i+2)th action, and thus
pertains to Di+2W .
2.4 Attacker goals and agent disposition
The notion of cooperation between agents can be viewed from at least two perspectives
of interest: sharing of information and sharing of success. The notion of attacker
cooperation classically employed in protocol analysis encompasses both aspects, as
it states the first while assuming that the second holds.
8
BME Classical Attack
(1) A → S : A,B
(2) S → A : {|kAB|}kAS ,{|kAB|}kBS
(3) A → B : {|kAB|}kBS
(1 ) A → E(S) : A,B
(1′) E(A)→ S : A,E
(2 ) S → A : {|kAE |}kAS ,{|kAE |}kES
(3 ) A → E(B) : {|kAE |}kES
Table 3: The Boyd-Mathuria Example protocol and a masquerading attack against it.
In this paper, we examine attackers that exhibit, with respect to cooperation, the
behavior we call complete non-collaboration: agents voluntarily abstain from sharing
information and do not consider their goals as met if they do not succeed in attacking.
The disposition of attacker E1 towards E2 belongs to one of the following basic classes:
active collaboration, passive collaboration, competition and conflict3. The focus of
this paper is on competition – a situation in which the goal is successfully attacking
the protocol, regardless of the disposition of other agents. From the perspective of a
competitive attacker, other attackers are not of interest per se: they are relevant factors
because they are sources of interference. If some interference is detected while carrying
out an attack, a competitive attacker will take countermeasures, attempting to negate
potentially adverse effects.
Sets of agents that are homogeneous with respect to disposition can be used to
define scenarios of interest. In the case study below, we explore a simple character-
istic scenario composed of two competitive attackers; we aim to bring into focus the
mechanisms by which two attackers can affect each other’s success.
3 A case study: the Boyd-Mathuria Example
A dishonest agent, aware that other independent attackers may be active on the net-
work, will seek to devise suitable novel attacks, so as to grant himself an edge on
unsuspecting competitors. As the mechanics of interaction and interference between
attackers have not been exhaustively studied in literature yet, it is not known a priori
how to systematically derive an attack behavior of this type.
In the following case study, we start from a simple protocol for which a vulnera-
bility is known; we devise for the known (“classical”) attack a variant that explicitly
considers the possibility of ongoing independent attacks. We describe a possible rea-
soning for a competitive attacker in the context of the protocol’s main features. Due to
space limitations, we give additional details about the case study in the appendix.
The protocol we consider as a case study is a key transport protocol described as
an example in [9]; we name it as the Boyd-Mathuria Example (BME), and present it
in Table 3 together with a classical attack against it. BME relies on the existence of
a trusted third-party server S to generate a session key kAB for agents A and B, where
each agent X is assumed to share a symmetric secret key kXS with S.
A is subject to a masquerading attack in which, at the end of a run of BME, A thinks
that he shares a session key with the honest agent B, while in fact he shares it with the
attacker E . Subsequent communication from A addressed to B is seen by E through the
spy-rule and removed with an erase request: E has successfully taken B’s place. This
3In active and passive collaboration there is a common goal to be pursued; the difference lies in choosing
a strategy that helps another vs. choosing a strategy that does not hinder another. In conflict scenarios, the
primary focus of interest is the attackers, rather than the protocol.
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attack prevents B from receiving any communication from A. Should the two agents
have prior agreement that such a communication was to take place, B is in the position
of detecting that something has gone wrong. E can prevent detection by staging a dual
man-in-the-middle attack.
If more than one attacker is active during a given protocol run, simultaneous execu-
tion of the classical attack could lead to A receiving multiple session keys as a response
to his (single) request to the server. This situation clearly indicates to A that an attack is
ongoing. A competitive attacker E1, wishing to prevent this situation from occurring,
could try removing from the network all the responses from S to A that do not pertain
to his own request. However, the characteristics of the (non-redundant) cryptographic
methods employed here do not allow distinguishing M1 =
(
{|kAE1 |}kAS ,{|kAE1 |}kE1S
)
(to let through) from M2 =
(
{|kAE2 |}kAS ,{|kAE2 |}kE2S
)
(to block). E1 can recognize the
format of M1 and M2 and can successfully decrypt M1 to recover kAE1 ; by decrypting
M2 with the key kE1S, E1 can still recover a value, but different from the previous one.
Not knowing kAE1 a priori, the attacker is not able to distinguish which of M1 and M2
contains the answer to his request for a key with A.
As a consequence, the attacker E1 is not able to know which messages to remove
in order to ensure that A accepts kAE1 as a session key to communicate with B. Com-
petitive attackers cannot rely on step (2) to enforce their attacks at the expense of their
competitors; furthermore, the probability of erasing all competing messages (while let-
ting one’s own pass) decreases with the number of active attackers. In this situation,
it becomes fundamental for a competitive attacker to gain exclusive access to the first
message and gain control over the messages that reach S, as opposed to the messages
coming from S 4.
After spying the initiator’s opening message, a competitive attacker E1 will there-
fore attempt to mount the classical attack, while keeping watch for other messages that
may be interpreted as attack traces. Any transiting message of the type (A,Em) for
which Em ∈ AE1 is interpreted as another active attack; E1 counters by requesting that
the message be erased. If Em is in HE1 , the message may be understood either as a
message from A — who would be initiating a parallel session of the protocol to obtain
a second session key — or as an indication that Em has been incorrectly labeled as
honest. In the first case, E1 will let the message through, as he has chosen to target
specifically the session key for the communication between A and B; in the second
case, he will protect his attack by erasing the message. If Em is in UE1 , E1 can choose
to either play conservatively and hypothesize the dishonesty of Em or let the message
through and interpret Em as the culprit in case the current attack fails.
BME is such that at most one attacker Ed can successfully mislead A into accept-
ing the key kAEd as a session key to communicate with B. Therefore, a successful
attack automatically entails exclusivity of success. An attack is successful if it goes
undetected by the initiator A. Our honest agents are intelligent and they make use of
all information available to perform in-protocol detection of attacks. With respect to
BME, a clear indication for A consists in receiving multiple responses from S after a
single session key request; if A receives multiple responses, he concludes that there has
been a security violation and thus does not employ any of the keys so received in his
later communications with B – choosing to try a fresh run of the protocol instead. From
the attackers’ perspective, an ongoing attack can be detected by observing a message
4 Of course, E1 could guess which message(s) to erase, but he would have the added difficulty of having
to decide whether to let the first message pass without knowing how many other messages will transit, if any
at all, and how many session keys were requested by A (as opposed to by his competitor(s)).
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of the type (A,X) transiting on the network; however, the attack trace is ambiguous
to spying attackers and has to be interpreted on the basis of current beliefs concerning
the honesty of X . A last feature of interest is that BME is rather friendly for attacker
labeling. Decisional processes can rely on at least some conclusive information on the
identity of the agents involved, because identifiers transit in the clear; attackers would
have to infer them otherwise.
We examine the outcome of attacks carried out in a non-collaborative environment
in six cases, corresponding to different conditions of knowledge and belief for E1 and
E2. Cases and attack traces are summarized in Table 4. In order to completely specify
agent behavior, we posit the following:
1. If an attacker E spies (A,Em) with Em ∈ HE or Em ∈UE , he will not request that
the message be erased. In the latter case, if E’s attack fails, Em is immediately
placed in AE .
2. Both E1 and E2 spy the opening message and are interested in attacking the
current protocol run; this allows us to leave aside the trivial cases in which only
one attacker is active for a given protocol run.
3. Due to space constraints, we detail only the cases in which canSee for step (3)
yields {E1,E2}. Cases in which only one of the attackers can access A’s response
can be found in appendix A.
Case 1: E1 and E2 know each other as honest.
E1 and E2 know each other’s identifiers (i.e. they are paying attention to each other:
E1 ∈ DE2 and E2 ∈ DE1), but they are both mistaken in that they have labeled the other
as honest (E1 ∈ HE2 and E2 ∈ HE1). E1 and E2 are unaware of active competitors and
mount the classical attack in steps (11) and (12). When the attackers spy two requests
to the server transiting on the network, they both believe that A wishes to request keys
with the honest agents B and E j.
(1.T1): S sends two messages before A can address a message to B. With the messages
in steps (21) and (22), A receives two keys instead of the single key requested. A now
knows that at least one attacker is active and abandons the protocol without sending a
message to B. The attackers do not spy the message they were hoping for (timeout)
and acquire the certainty that at least another active attacker is around. The attackers
can employ ad-hoc strategies to search for the mislabeled or unknown attacker. If the
attackers are careful to keep track of the messages (A,X) pertaining to a given session,
they can make informed guesses as to whom, amongst the known agents, they might
have mislabeled.
(1.T2): A receives a reply from S, answers B and stops listening. A receives the mes-
sages he expects and closes the current session before receiving the second response
from S. E1 is successful in his attack, whereas E2 believes that he has succeeded when
he has, in fact, decrypted the wrong key. None of the agents have an opportunity for
detection.
(1.T3): A receives a reply from S, answers B and keeps listening. A replies with the
message in step (3), resulting in both E1 and E2 believing that they have succeeded.
However, after receiving (22), A detects the attack and abstains from employing kAE1
in his future communications with B. Thus, even if for different reasons, both attackers
in fact fail. Furthermore, they both continue to hold their mistaken belief that the other
attacker is in fact honest.
Case 2: E1 and E2 know each other as attackers.
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T1: cases 1, 3, 4, 6 T2 and [T3]: cases 1, 3, 4, 6
(1 ) A → E1,2(S) : A,B
↓ (11) E1(A)→ S : A,E1
↑ (12) E2(A)→ S : A,E2
(21) S → A : M1
(22) S → A : M2
(1 ) A → E1,2(S) : A,B
↓ (11) E1(A)→ S : A,E1
↑ (12) E2(A)→ S : A,E2
(21) S → A : M1
(3 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|kAE1 |}kE1 S
[(22) S → A : M2 ]
T4: case 2 T5: case 5
(1 ) A → E1,2(S) : A,B
↓ (11)+ E1(A)→ E2(S) : A,E1
↑ (12)+ E2(A)→ E1(S) : A,E2
(1 ) A → E1,2(S) : A,B
↓ (11) E1(A)→ E2(S) : A,E1
↑ (12) E2(A)→ S : A,E2
(2 ) S → A : M2
(3 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|kAE2 |}kE2S
Where: M1 = {|kAE1 |}kAS ,{|kAE1 |}kE1 S , M2 = {|kAE2 |}kAS ,{|kAE2 |}kE2 S
Table 4: Traces for non-collaborative attacks against BME. Traces are exhaustive: E1 and E2
have priority over honest agents and S is honest. Arrows: relative order between (11) and (12) is
irrelevant in determining the outcome.
E1 and E2 know each other’s identifier (E1 ∈ DE2 and E2 ∈ DE1) and have correctly
understood that the other is behaving as a dishonest agent (E1 ∈ AE2 and E2 ∈ AE1).
Each attacker is aware of the presence of a competitor, which they have correctly la-
beled. Each attacker is attempting to gain exclusive access to the initial communication
towards S and to ensure that only his request reaches S. E1 and E2 erase each other’s
request to S. Within our model, no attacker can be certain that his message has been
received by its intended receiver; the attackers may wish to replay step (11) and (12) if
a message of the type {|kAE j |}kAS ,{|kAE j |}kE jS is not spied on the network within a rea-
sonable time. This option is marked with (·)+ in Table 4. However, the active presence
of the competitor ensures that no message reaches S. A notices that an anomalous situ-
ation is occurring, because his request to the server is not being served in a reasonable
time. A interprets the situation as a denial-of-service attack and abandons the protocol.
Case 3: E1 and E2 are unaware of each other.
E1 and E2 are unaware of the other’s presence – i.e. they are not paying attention to
the other’s activity (E1 /∈ DE2 and E2 /∈ DE1). Subcases follow closely those described
for case 1 above. The only significant difference concerns detection for trace T1: here
the attackers must employ exploratory strategies (Inflow-Spy or Outflow-Spy), because
they failed to spy an additional message of type (A,Em) transiting on the network. The
failure to observe such a message is a strong indicator that the competitor’s identifier is
unknown. In 2-attacker scenarios this is the only legitimate conclusion, whereas with
three or more attackers this situation may also arise from the interplay between erase
and spy operations.
Case 4: E2 knows E1 as honest.
Only one out of the two attackers E1 and E2 is paying attention to the other and knows
his identifier. Here we consider E1 ∈ HE2 and E2 /∈ DE1 . Regardless of the order in
which steps (11) and (12) occur, the attacker in disadvantage E1 does not spy the mes-
sage at step (12); E2 does spy (11) but, trusting his judgement on E1’s honesty, does
not request it to be erased. As a consequence, similarly to case 1, the traces follow
schemes T1, T2 and T3. Significant differences concern detection in T1: E1 detects
12
the presence of an unknown attacker, whereas E2 learns of a mislabeled or unknown
attacker. The successful attackers in traces T2 and T3 are those whose requests to S are
served first; knowledge does not affect the outcome.
Case 5: E2 knows E1 as dishonest.
Only one out of the two attackers E1 and E2 is paying attention to the other and knows
his identifier. Here we consider E1 ∈ AE2 and E2 /∈ DE1 Regardless of the order in
which steps (11) and (12) occur, E1 does not spy the message at step (12) and E2 uses a
direct attack against the competitor. E2 removes E1’s request to the server and remains
the only attacker in play, leading A into accepting kAE2 as a session key. E1 does not
have an opportunity to detect the competitor.
Case 6: E2 knows E1, but he is unsure of E1’s honesty.
Only one out of the two attackers E1 and E2 is paying attention to the other and knows
his identifier. Here we consider E1 ∈ UE2 and E2 /∈ DE1 . This case reduces to case 4,
with the only difference that E2 is testing the dishonesty of E1, instead of believing his
honesty. Whenever E2 realizes that he has failed his attack, he adds E1 into AE2 and
deletes it from UE2 .
General considerations.
In traces T2 and T3, the winning attacker is the one whose request is served first by S.
S is an honest agent but it is not constrained to answering requests in the exact order in
which they are received. Attackers do not have control over which requests are served
first, although this factor determines whether they cannot do better than acquire the
wrong key. Attackers realize in-protocol that they have failed only when they cannot
spy a response from A, i.e. when they do not acquire any keys. Post-protocol detection,
on the other hand, can occur also when an attacker with a wrong key attempts to decrypt
the later communications addressed by A to B.
The case study highlights that, if A keeps the session open for a reasonable time
after step (3), he can improve his chances of discovering that the key is compromised.
This is a simple strategy that is beneficial and does not depend on the particular pro-
tocol. Furthermore, when A receives two answers from S in response to his single
request, he now has two keys – at least one of which is shared with an attacker. If
honest agents are immersed in a retaliatory framework [7, 8], such keys can be used to
identify attackers, to feed them false information or, in general, to launch well-aimed
retaliatory attacks.
4 Defending vulnerable protocols against attacks
Key exchange protocols are amongst the most used cryptographic protocols. It is a
common security practice to establish a secure channel by first exchanging a session
key and then using it to authenticate and encrypt the data with symmetric cryptography.
The security of all communications occurring during a session rests on the integrity of
the key. In this context, it is not important per se that a key has been acquired by an
attacker: what matters is whether a compromised key is used. Rather then on prevent-
ing the acquisition of a session key from ever occurring, the focus is on detecting that
the key has been compromised – so as to prevent an attack from spreading to the entire
session traffic.
If a protocol is vulnerable, a single DY attacker will succeed with certainty. How-
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canSee Cases Case 2 Case 5: Case 5:
1,3,4,6 E ∈AG G ∈AE
{E,G} ∼+ √ √
{G}
√ √ √ √
{E} ∼+ √ √
Table 5: Effects of introducing a guardian G for BME when attacker E is active. G operates
according to the same strategy as the attackers in the case study. G’s active interference results
in A detecting attacks always (√), sometimes (∼), always if A commits to listening after step (3)
(+). The guardian is progressively more effective the more his beliefs and knowledge reflect the
actual set of attackers. G can be effective even when he is not aware of E’s presence.
ever, if attacks to the same protocol are carried out in a more complex network environ-
ment, success is not guaranteed. As shown in the case study, in competitive scenarios
with equal-opportunity attackers it is not possible for a given attacker to ensure that an
attack is successful under all circumstances. The outcome depends on the strategy and
knowledge conditions of all the active agents, on the visibility of erased messages to
other attackers (canSee 6= {E1,E2}) and on the order with which S processes requests.
In a sense, the presence of an independent active attacker constrains the success of
otherwise sure-fire attacks.
This principle can be exploited to facilitate detection of attacks against vulnerable
protocols. Honest agents should not, in principle, be informed of the specific attack
trace to which they are vulnerable. Hence, if honest agents can perform detection at
all, it has to be on the basis of flags that are independent of the specific attack trace
– and, in general, independent also of the protocol in use. Such flags encode local
defense criteria and can be as simple as realizing that no answer has arrived within a
time considered reasonable or realizing that two (different) answers have been sent in
response to a single request.
The basic idea is constructing a network agent that causes protocol-independent
flags to be raised – via deliberate interference with ongoing attacks. In addition, one
such guardian agent is formally an attacker, and can therefore be configured with
knowledge of the attack trace(s). The guardian’s task can be formulated as raising
protocol-independent flags in correspondence to protocol-dependent indicators.
By using such an ad-hoc competitor as defense, it is possible, in some cases, to al-
low detection of otherwise-undetectable attacks. If no flag is raised for A, the guardian
may be the only attacker at work. In this case, no ill-intentioned attacker has success-
fully concluded an attack; from the standpoint of A, actual security is not affected. A
guardian is a practical solution even when it is not all-powerful: any attack detected by
A thanks to the guardian’s active presence is an improvement in security. In Table 5,
we show the effects of introducing a guardian G for BME, configured as the attackers
in the case study. It is not necessary to demand that the guardian monitor all traffic
– which is unrealistic at best; on the other hand, all monitored traffic enjoys partial
protection.
Attacks failing are, by themselves, markers that there are other dishonest agents at
work; this fact can be used by the guardian G as a basis for further detection, possibly
on behalf of honest agents. Then guess-and-test strategies can be used to acquire an
understanding of the second attacker’s identity; a rudimentary example is the strategy
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used by our attackers for BME when they spy (A,Em) and Em ∈ U. Across multiple
iterations of the attack procedure and under different hypotheses concerning (HG, AG,
UG), the attacker’s identity will eventually be revealed.
In actual scenarios, protocols are implemented through programs in the users’ com-
puters. It is very difficult to force users to stop using a protocol as soon as a vulnerabil-
ity is discovered. The more widespread the protocol, the more difficult it is to ensure
that it quickly goes out of use. Two aspects are important: that every user (a) is in-
formed of the new vulnerability and (b) takes action in switching to a secure protocol.
Statistics on software upgrades are an unfortunate example of this type of issue.
By designing the user-end software to inform the user of a security failure whenever
protocol-independent flags are raised, a guardian can help solve the notification issue
as well as raise the likelihood that the user will take action and upgrade. When the
weakness in the protocol is understood, it may be a cost-effective investment to design
a guardian with an effective interference strategy, so as to facilitate restoring network
security.
5 Conclusions and future work
The traditional goal of protocol analysis is discovering attacks, to prompt replacing a
vulnerable protocol with an improved and more secure one. Reductions are centered
on attacks, either to reduce the search space for attacks (e.g. [4, 18, 19]) or to reduce
the number of agents (e.g. [4, 14]). In particular, if there exists an attack involving
n collaborating attackers, then there exists an “equivalent” attack involving only one.
Within this perspective, it is known that n-DY attackers equal in attack power a single
DY attacker, and that the same can be said of Machiavelli-type attackers [16, 21]. As
a result, an exhaustive search for attacks can be performed in a reduced-complexity
model.
On the other hand, within our proposed approach the goal of analysis is finding a
strategy to defend the system against existing attacks, rather than identifying vulnera-
bilities to prompt redesigning the protocol. We would be performing protocol analysis
to identify possible defenses, rather than attacks.
In the case study, we have shown a counterexample to the statement: “if there exists
a defense against an attack in a 2-attacker scenario, then there exists an equivalent
defense in a 1-attacker scenario”. This statement mirrors the classical result on n-
to-1 reducibility and the counterexample shows that exhaustive searches for defenses
against attacks cannot be carried out in reduced-complexity settings, as they require at
least two attackers.
Having chosen vulnerable protocols, in a single-attacker situation there is no pro-
tocol-independent indicator that could be used by honest agents to become aware that
security has been compromised. If there is a single attacker, no simple defense is
possible and the protocol inevitably fails its security goals. On the other hand, by
exploiting an ad-hoc competitor (the guardian) as a defense, in certain conditions we
can successfully raise protocol-independent indicators of ongoing attacks and protect
the system. Introducing an appropriate guardian procedure as soon as new attacks are
discovered can mitigate the consequences of flawed protocols still being in use.
Along the line of work presented in this paper, we have investigated two addi-
tional simple protocols as case studies: the Shamir-Rivest-Adleman three-pass proto-
col, which differs significantly from BME in that success is not necessarily exclusive,
and the Beller-Yacobi protocol, which requires interacting with a second honest agent
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to carry out a masquerading attack. The goal of these investigations is to bring into fo-
cus how the salient features of each protocol are reflected in the possible mechanisms
of interference. The first case study is available as additional material in appendix
B. A second topic of interest is evaluating (i) whether the mechanisms of interaction
highlighted in two-attacker scenarios are directly portable to situations with more than
two non-collaborating attackers, (ii) whether they require ad-hoc generalization and
(iii) whether new types of interaction emerge when more than two dishonest agents are
active. We are investigating this in more detail, along with a (semi-)automatic imple-
mentation of our approach.
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A Extended tables for BME
In this appendix, we present a detailed view of the outcome of an attack carried out
against BME and involving only the non-collaborative attackers E1 and E2. Refer to
Section 3 for a definition of BME, attacker behavior against BME, attack traces and
cases.
Note that in cases 1, 2 and 3 (shown in Table 6), E j’s request is the j-th served by
S. In cases 4, 5 and 6, E2 is the attacker with knowledge advantage. For clarity, for
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cases 4 and 6 (see Table 7) we mark as E j* the case in which E j’s request is served first
by S. In case 5, E2’s request is the only served and the distinction is unnecessary.
A competitive attacker E attacking BME can:
• succeed and compromise a key that A will use;
• fail and realize it (by timeout);
• fail without realizing it, by acquiring the wrong key;
• fail without realizing it, even though E acquired the right key.
Honest agents under attack can:
• detect the attack and abandon the protocol before carrying out step (3);
• realize that the key has been compromised and keep safe by not using it;
• fail to detect an attack but use their keys safely, because all attackers have failed
to acquire the correct key;
• use a compromised key.
Attackers who realize their failure can infer the following:
α Mislabeled or unknown attacker. The attacker spies two messages from S and
none from A in response; he deduces that A had opened a single session and that
at least one request to S (in addition to his own) was an attack. The attacker
realizes that he has either mislabeled as honest one of the active attackers or that
an unknown competitor is active.
β Unknown attacker. The attacker spies two messages from S and none from A
in response; he deduces that A had opened a single session and that at least one
request to S (in addition to his own) was an attack. However, he has seen no
additional requests of the type (A,X) transit on the network; the attacker realizes
that an unknown competitor is active on the network.
γ Missed message: mislabeled or unknown attacker. The attacker spies only one
message from S but no reply from A; all messages from S that successfully reach
A are seen, so the attacker deduces that he has missed A’s response. Thus, an
active competitor (mislabeled or unknown) has erased it, preventing the attacker
from acquiring it through the spy rule.
δ Missed message. Similar to case γ. The attacker does not draw further conclu-
sions because he is already aware of an active attacker that may have erased the
message.
ε Suspect condemned. The attacker E has put to test the dishonesty of an agent X
in UE (the suspect). Failing the attack is interpreted as a confirmation that the
suspect is dishonest: X is placed into AE .
18
Trace canSee Agent Result Belief Key Detection Guardian
T1 Case 1 Case 3
– E1 failure failure none α β of help
E2 failure failure none α β of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
T2 step (3) Case 1 Case 3
{E1,E2} E1 success success right none none of help
E2 failure success wrong none none no effect
A attacked safe broken none none
{E1} E1 success success right none none of help
E2 failure failure none γ γ no effect
A attacked safe broken none none
{E2} E1 failure failure none γ γ of help
E2 failure success wrong none none of help
A safe safe used none none
T3 step (3) Case 1 Case 3
{E1,E2} E1 failure success right none none of help
E2 failure success wrong none none of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
{E1} E1 failure success right none none of help
E2 failure failure none γ γ of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
{E2} E1 failure failure none γ γ of help
E2 failure success wrong none none of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
T4 – Case 2
E1 failure failure none correct understanding of help
E2 failure failure none correct understanding of help
A safe attack none no answer: DoS
T5 step (3) Case 5
{E1,E2} E1 failure success wrong none no effect
E2 success success right correct understanding of help
A attacked safe broken none
{E1} E1 failure success wrong none of help
E2 failure failure none δ of help
A safe safe in use none
{E2} E1 failure failure none γ no effect
E2 success success right correct understanding of help
A attacked safe broken none
Table 6: Outcomes of a competitive attack against BME involving the attackers E1 and E2 and
the honest initiator A (cases 1, 2, 3 and 5). Traces are described in Table 4; canSee() describes
the set of attackers who spy the message sent by A at step (3); for each role, we report the actual
result of the attack (result), if the agent believes he has succeeded or failed (belief) and whether
he has acquired the right key, the wrong key or no key at all (key). When attackers realize their
failure, they can infer the reason for failing as shown in the column Detection; the honest agent
A can detect ongoing attacks by receiving two answers from S or none. In the last column, we
show the result of introducing a guardian agent, playing the role in the corresponding row against
an attacker playing the other role.
B A case study: the Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three-Pass
Protocol
The Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three-Pass protocol (SRA3P), described in [13], has been
proposed to transmit data securely on insecure channels, bypassing the difficulties con-
nected to the absence of prior agreements between the agents A and B to establish a
shared key. The security property targeted by SRA3P is confidentiality; if the message
transmitted is interpreted as a session key, then the protocol can be considered as a key
transport protocol.
SRA3P relies on the assumption that the kind of cryptography employed is commu-
tative, i.e. that {|{|M|}KA|}KB = {|{|M|}KB |}KA holds. We use the standard notation for
symmetric cryptography to emphasize commutativity. The protocol consists in three
message exchanges, as shown in Table 8A.
The classical attack to SRA3P exploits A as an oracle for the content of the message
(Table 8B). The attacker E replaces the intended recipient B in receiving the message
and pretends to perform step (2) – in actuality sending back the message {|M|}KA with-
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Trace canSee Agent Result Belief Key Detection Guardian
T1 – Case 4 Case 6
E1* failure failure none β β of help
E1 failure failure none β β of help
E2* failure failure none α ε of help
E2 failure failure none α ε of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
T2 step (3) Case 4 Case 6
{E1,E2} E1* success success right none none of help
E1 failure success wrong none none no effect
E2* success success right none none of help
E2 failure success wrong none none no effect
A attacked safe broken none none
{E1} E1* success success right none none of help
E1 failure success wrong none none of help
E2* failure failure none γ ε of help
E2 failure failure none γ ε no effect
A attacked safe broken none none
{E2} E1* failure failure none γ γ of help
E1 failure failure none γ γ no effect
E2* success success right none none of help
E2 failure success wrong none none of help
A safe safe used none none
T3 step (3) Case 4 Case 6
{E1,E2} E1* failure success right none none of help
E1 failure success wrong none none of help
E2* failure success right none none of help
E2 failure success wrong none none of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
{E1} E1* failure success right none none of help
E1 failure success wrong none none of help
E2* failure failure none γ ε of help
E2 failure failure none γ ε of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
{E2} E1* failure failure none γ γ of help
E1 failure failure none γ γ of help
E2* failure success right none none of help
E2 failure success wrong none none of help
A safe attack not used 2 keys 2 keys
Table 7: Outcomes of a competitive attack against BME involving the attackers E1 and E2 and
the honest initiator A (cases 4 and 6). E j*: E j’s request at step (1i) is served by S first. Traces
are described in Table 4; canSee() describes the set of attackers who spy the message sent by A
at step (3); for each role, we report the actual result of the attack (result), if the agent believes
he has succeeded or failed (belief) and whether he has acquired the right key, the wrong key or
no key at all (key). When attackers realize their failure, they can infer the reason for failing as
shown in the column Detection; the honest agent A can detect ongoing attacks by receiving two
answers from S or none. In the last column, we show the result of introducing a guardian agent
playing the role in the corresponding row against an attacker playing the other role.
out further encryption. A continues according to the protocol and removes his key from
the message, thus sending back the secret M without any encryption. We represent the
message as M∗ to emphasize that M transits in the clear without A meaning it.
The classical attack is successful; however, it prevents the intended recipient B
from receiving any messages at all. In case the honest agents had prior agreement
that an exchange was to take place, B can detect that something has gone wrong. The
classical attack is very strong against detection even in this case: after discovering
M, the attacker E impersonates A and performs the protocol with B, de facto carrying
out a complete man-in-the-middle attack. In this manner, the attack on SRA3P goes
completely undetected and the attacker gains access to the secret key M.
Provided that some attacker answered A in step (2) by sending {|M|}KA , it is suffi-
cient to spy the message in step (3) to acquire the secret. In our set-up, any attacker
attempting to erase a message is always successful in preventing honest agents from
receiving it, but he is not necessarily successful in hiding it from other attackers (all
attackers in canSee(< A,M∗,B >, i) have access to M). In this situation, E2 can prevent
his competitors from acquiring the secret only by weakening their ability to identify the
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message M∗ as the true response of A in step (3). A competitive attacker will therefore
attempt to mislead his competitors by sending on the network fake messages that are
in no way related to the information coming from the initiator A.
(A) SRA3P (B) Classical Attack
(1) A → B : {|M|}KA
(2) B → A : {|{|M|}KA|}KB
(3) A → B : {|M|}KB
(1) A → E(B) : {|M|}KA
(2) E(B)→ A : {|M|}KA
(3) A → E(B) : M∗ = M
(C) Strong attack (D) Competitive attack
(1 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|M|}KA
(2 ) E1(B)→ A : {|M|}KA
(3′) E2(A)→ E1 : M f ake
(3 ) A → E1,2(B) : M∗
(1 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|M|}KA
(2 ) E1(B)→ A : {|M|}KA
(3′) E2(A)→ E1(B) : M f ake
(3 ) A → E1,2(B) : M∗
Table 8: Attacks against the Shamir-Rivest-Adelman Three-Pass Protocol (SRA3P). KA and KB
are private keys and cryptography is commutative. (A): Protocol followed by honest agents.
(B): Classical attack on SRA3P, employed by attackers when unaware of active competitors.
(C): Strong non-collaborative attack, employed by attackers when the competitor’s identifier is
known (E2 knows that his competitor is E1). (D): Competitive attack, employed by attackers
when aware of the existence of an active competitor but unsure of the competitor’s identity (E2
knows that he has a competitor but does not know that it is E1).
If the recipient of a fake message is expecting to receive M∗, he may be led into
thinking that he has successfully carried out his attack. He may then stop spying the
current run of the conversation between A and B and conclude that he has succeeded
when in fact he has acquired the wrong “secret” M f ake. If, instead, the competitor E1 is
not following the classical attack and chooses to keep listening in on the conversation,
he receives more than one message playing the role of M∗ and does not know which
one has been sent by the honest agent A.
The competitor faces a degree of uncertainty in identifying M∗ that is not present in
the classical attack. The degree of uncertainty to which E1 is subject can be increased
arbitrarily by E2, who can send multiple and unrelated fake messages, both before and
after M∗ transits on the network. This style of attack grows in effectiveness as E2 is
better able to construct misleading fake messages.
The success of this non-collaborative behavior in securing sole ownership of the
secret depends critically on the listening behavior of the competitor: if E1 stops spying
network traffic as soon as a response is received, then it is critical for E2 to send a fake
message before A’s reply; in case of success, the competitor fails to acquire the secret.
If the competitor is actively listening past the reception of the first response, then M∗
is eventually acquired – but not by itself: a situation of uncertainty arises.
In classical settings, uncertainty does little more than affect the probability that
an attack will be successful; however, if honest agents are immersed in a retaliatory
framework, guessing the wrong M∗ and using it as a session key to communicate with
A could have significant consequences. Therefore, attackers in non-collaborative sce-
narios should be careful to evaluate the probability of correctly guessing M∗ against the
added costs of failure – either in terms of retaliation or of the strategic risks of being
detected or identified by honest agents.
As a result of this discussion, for competitive scenarios involving SRA3P, we pro-
pose two variants of the classical attack, employed by attackers who are aware of the
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presence of active competitors. We term the variants strong and competitive attack, dif-
fering with respect to attacker knowledge. If the attacker is aware of the identity of the
competitor, he will employ the strong attack, whereas he will resort to the competitive
attack when only the competitor’s presence is known. These new attack behaviors are
also oracle-type (transmission step, see [12] for a taxonomy of flaws and attacks) and
are shown in Table 8C and 8D.
The main difference between the two non-collaborative attack behaviors lies in the
method of delivery of fake messages to E1. If the competitor’s identity is known, E2
can ensure that the fake message is seen even if E1 is not paying attention to E2’s traffic:
E2 sends the fake message directly, using the network primitive send. If, on the other
hand, E1’s identity is unknown, E2 is forced to rely on a reasonable prediction of E1’s
behavior and thus injects the fake message, impersonating A. The misleading message
M f ake is successfully delivered if E2 is present in E1’s dataset and E1 spies it. If E1 does
not gain M f ake, E2 fails to pollute the competitor’s knowledge but does not compromise
his own ability to observe M∗
SRA3P is such that all attentive attackers can potentially acquire the secret if an
attack on the initiator A is carried out. Exclusive knowledge of the secret can only
occur through two mechanisms: through the outcome of erase requests (which is not
under the control of network agents) or by misleading other attackers into interpreting
a fake message as M∗.
An attack is successful if it goes undetected by the initiator A, who then transmits
M in the clear as M∗. Our agents are intelligent and they make use of all information
available to perform in-protocol detection of attacks. With respect to SRA3P, a clear
indication for A consists in receiving a duplicate response from agents posing as B;
under this circumstance, A concludes that there has been a security violation and halts
the execution of the protocol to protect the secret M.
From the attackers’ perspective, an ongoing attack can be detected by observing
that the message transiting on the network in step (2) is equal to the message {|M|}KA
transiting on step (1). The attack trace is unambiguous to spying attackers. SRA3P is
very unfriendly for attacker labeling: identifiers do not transit on the network, neither
in the clear nor encrypted. Decisional processes cannot rely on any conclusive infor-
mation concerning the identity of the agents involved in a given protocol run and must
resort to inference on the basis of their current knowledge.
B.1 Attacker configuration and outcomes of interaction
We examine the outcome of attacks carried out in a non-collaborative environment
in six cases, corresponding to different conditions of knowledge and belief for two
attackers, E1 and E2. Refer to Table 9 for a synthetic view of the message exchanges
in each configuration. In order to completely specify agent behavior, we state the
following:
1. An attacker who spies, before starting his own attack, the attack trace {|M|}KA
transiting on the network moves on to step (3) of his chosen attack (strong or
competitive). If the attacker spies the attack trace after sending {|M|}KA himself,
then he requests that the message be erased. In our set-up, an erase-request
always prevents the message from reaching its honest recipient, although other
attackers cannot deterministically be prevented from spying it. This behavioral
rule accounts for attackers being aware that duplicate messages can be exploited
to perform attack detection.
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2. An attacker that is employing a competitive attack (as he is aware of the presence
of active competitors) continues spying on the network even after receiving the
first message.
3. An attacker may learn that he has incorrectly classified an agent as honest. We
do not wish to focus here on decisional processes for agent classification and
therefore we posit that the decisional process is an oracle for the identifier of
the mislabeled agent. We stipulate that, whenever evidence that an agent has
been mislabeled arises, the decisional processes of the agents allow relabeling
in A the dishonest agent who has triggered the anomalous situation detected.
For completeness, we explicitly mention in case 1.T1-B which choices would be
available to the agent, should the decisional process yield incorrect answers.
4. We posit that canSee() for A’s opening message comprises both E1 and E2; if this
were not the case, only one attacker would be active in the run of the protocol
examined.
5. We postulate that canSee() yields the entire attacker set for the message sent in
step (3) by the honest agent A. If this were not the case, then only some (one) of
the intruders could acquire M∗. For the sake of concisiveness, in the rest of this
section we discuss explicitly only the situation posited. Refer to Section C for
detailed analysis of how outcomes are affected by canSee().
Case 1: E1 and E2 know each other as honest.
E1 and E2 know each other’s identifiers (i.e. they are paying attention to each other:
E1 ∈ DE2 and E2 ∈ DE1), but they are both mistaken in that they have labeled the other
as honest (E1 ∈ HE2 and E2 ∈ HE1). Initially, E1 and E2 are unaware of active competi-
tors and mount the classical attack The first between E1 and E2 to send the message at
step (2) reveals to the other that he has incorrectly classified an agent. Without loss of
generality, let us suppose that E1 attacks first. E2 employs his decisional processes to
identify the mislabeled attacker.
(1.T1-A): E1 is identified as an attacker by E2. E2 switches to the strong attack, with
the goal of gaining exclusive access to M. In step (32), E2 sends a fake message to the
unsuspecting competitor E1, who is expecting a message from A containing M∗ on the
clear. E1 may now think that he has successfully completed the attack, but in fact he
did not acquire the secret M. After receiving M f ake, E1 stops monitoring the network,
according to the classical attack behavior.
If E1 continues to spy, he will also acquire M∗. However, E1 finds himself in a sit-
uation of uncertainty, as he is not able to determine if it is M f ake or M∗ (or neither) that
comes from A. E1 can at most determine that there is an unlabeled active competitor,
one that he has not previously identified in AE1 .
(1.T1-B): E2 fails to identify E1 as a dishonest agent. E2 has two strategies available:
i) risk revealing himself as an attacker and employ the strong attack against all agents
he is attentive to (with the exception of the initiator of the protocol); ii) employ the
competitive attack with partial impersonification.
Case 2: E1 and E2 know each other as attackers.
Both E1 and E2 (correctly) think that there are active competitors; they know the com-
petitor’s identity and thus both follow the strong attack. The attack trace prescribes
waiting for a competitor to start the attack procedure, by sending {|M|}KA to A. Both
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attackers are waiting for the other to take action. The situation could result in a dead-
lock, but the attackers know that a message has been erased and that A is waiting for
an answer.
The attackers wait for a reasonable amount of time and then one takes the initiative.
Let us suppose that it is E2 who first answers A. The strong attack consists in polluting
the knowledge base of the competitor with a fake message. Both attackers send their
fake messages (M′ and M′′), thereby recreating the uncertainty of the previous case.
This time the uncertainty spreads over both attackers and none dominates the other.
T1: cases 1, 4, 5, 6 T2: case 2
(1 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|M|}kA
(21) E1(B)→ A : {|M|}kA
(32) E2(A)→ E1 : M f ake
(3 ) A → E[1],2(B) : M∗
(1 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|M|}kA
(2 ) E2(B)→ A : {|M|}kA
(31) E1(A)→ E2 : M′
(32) E2(A)→ E1 : M′′
(3 ) A → E1,2(B) : M∗
T3: case 3 T4: cases 4, 5 and 6
(1 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|M|}kA
(21) E1(B)→ A : {|M|}kA
(22) E2(B)→ A : {|M|}kA
(1 ) A → E1,2(B) : {|M|}kA
(22) E2(B)→ A : {|M|}kA
(21) E1(B)→ E2(A) : {|M|}kA
(32) E2(A)→ E1 : M f ake
(3 ) A → E1,[2](B) : M∗
Table 9: Traces for non-collaborative attacks against SRA3P. Traces are exhaustive aside for
order of attackers. Case 1: E1 and E2 know each other as honest. Case 2: E1 and E2 know each
other as dishonest. Case 3: E1 and E2 are unaware of each other. Case 4: E2 knows E1 as honest.
Case 5: E2 knows E1 as dishonest. Case 6: E2 knows E1 but has not yet established a belief on
E1’s honesty.
Case 3: E1 and E2 are unaware of each other.
E1 and E2 are unaware of the other’s presence – i.e. they are not paying attention to the
other’s activity (E1 /∈ DE2 and E2 /∈ DE1). Thus, both E1 and E2 employ the classical
attack. The attackers, not paying attention to the other’s communications, do not realize
that an attack trace is transiting on the network. A receives a duplicate message, that
he correctly interprets in terms of an ongoing attack. The attackers are detected, even
if not explicitly identified. A abandons the protocol to keep the secret M safe.
Case 4: E2 knows E1 as honest.
E2 is not aware of other attackers and can choose to attack right away or wait a reason-
able time to try detecting a mislabeled attacker.
(4.T1): E2 waits and E1 starts the classical attack. E2 has the chance of detecting E1
as an attacker and starts the strong attack. The situation is reduced to case 1. If E1
continues to listen on the network after the end of his (unsuccessful) attack, he realizes
that he is in a situation of uncertainty, not knowing which between M∗ and M f ake is A’s
secret. E1 is now certain that an attacker is present but he doesn’t know who, because
the identifier E2 is not in E1’s proprietary dataset. E1 can thus switch to an exploratory
strategy, using the inflow-spy rule for the subsequent runs of the protocol.
(4.T4): E2 starts the classical attack. Not having E2’s identifier in his dataset, E1 does
not pay attention to the message and does not notice the attack trace transiting. E1
continues his attack and sends {|M|}kA . In step (21), E2 detects the dishonesty of E1
and switches to the strong attack. There is an important difference with respect to case
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4.T1: E2 erases the message sent by E1 to A, thereby preventing A from detecting a
duplicate message and protecting his own attack.
Case 5: E2 knows E1 as dishonest.
Only one out of the two attackers E1 and E2 is paying attention to the other and knows
his identifier. Here we consider E1 ∈ AE2 and E2 /∈ DE1 . E2 is sure of the presence of a
competitor and knows his identifier. When A initiates the protocol, E2 waits for E1 to
start the attack and prepares to send a fake message in step (32), employing the strong
attack (case 5.T1). If E1 does not send {|M|}kA within a reasonable time (case 5.T4), E2
performs the attack in step (22). This message goes undetected by E1, who will send
his message at a later point. E2 is aware that another attacker is present and is on the
watch for a replicate attack message, which he erases. If E1 acts first, the sequence of
messages is the same as in case 1; otherwise, the sequence is the same as in case 4.T4.
If E1 continues to spy after receiving M f ake, he can realize that he is in uncertainty
with respect to M and can therefore deduce the presence of an unknown attacker. E1
moves on to employing exploratory versions of the spy-rules to try gaining information
about the identity of the competitor.
Case 6: E2 knows E1 but he is unsure of E1’s honesty.
Only one out of the two attackers E1 and E2 is paying attention to the other and knows
his identifier. Here we consider E1 ∈ UE2 and E2 /∈ DE1 . This case reduces to cases
5.T1 and 5.T4, according to who first initiates the attack by sending {|M|}kA . In case
6.T1, E1 opens the attack, whereas in case 6.T4 it is E2 who opens. In all cases, E2 has
a clear advantage because he is paying attention to E1’s messages but his own messages
are not being attended to. In addition to what happens in case 5, E2 has the opportunity
to correctly label E1: E2 moves E1’s identifier from UE2 into AE2 .
B.2 Success criteria for competitive attackers and honest agents
Attackers in the SRA3P scenario have a complex success criterion. The best possible
result for an attacker consists in i) violating security without the honest agent realizing
it and ii) making it such that the other attackers conclude their attacks with false infor-
mation (M f ake taken for M∗) and without realizing that the information is false. This
set of conditions describes an attacker with complete dominance over the system – both
over honest agents and over his competitors. As shown for SRA3P (and for BME in
Section 3), in competitive scenarios with equal-opportunity attackers it is not possible,
in general, to ensure a complete victory under all circumstances.
The result of an attack depends on the strategy and on the knowledge conditions of
all the active agents. As a consequence, a competitive agent will try to secure the best
result (compatibly with his knowledge of the system) and he will strategically evaluate
if it is preferable, for example, to risk being identified as an attacker by other agents or
to increase the degree of uncertainty of the competitors. A competitive agent attacking
SRA3P evaluates the following factors as part of his success criterion:
1. Success in gaining the secret protected by the security system (or, more gen-
erally, in invalidating the target properties of the protocol). Because SRA3P is
vulnerable to the classical attack, a single attacker without competition is always
successful. The first priority of our competitive attackers is preserving the suc-
cess of their own attacks, even in the presence of active competitors.
2. Absence of uncertainty on the secret.
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3. Exclusivity in access to the secret.
4. Effects on competitors: denying competitors either access to the secret or cer-
tainty on it. The ideal case for a competitive attacker is negating access to the
secret and at the same time inducing competitors to think that they have suc-
ceeded.
5. Possibility of being identified as an attacker by other attackers. Attackers are
aware that knowing the dishonesty of an agent is an advantage, therefore they
seek to limit the situations in which they can be detected or identified through an
explorative spy-rule. A good example of this strategy is the difference between
the two non-collaborative attacks against SRA3P – employing a direct send to
the competitor or relying on the prediction that the competitor will spy.
6. Possibility of being identified as an attacker by honest agents.
7. Possibility of identifying competitors – and thus of acquiring a strategic advan-
tage for later runs of the protocol.
An honest agent that uses SRA3P distinguishes five relevant conditions, each associ-
ated to a different level of alarm:
1. No attacker has gained the secret and the secret has correctly reached the in-
tended recipient (security). Since SRA3P is vulnerable to attacks, in the presence
of attackers this condition never occurs.
2. No attacker has succeeded in gaining the security secret, but the secret has not
reached its intended recipient (stalemate, deadlock). For SRA3P, this condition
occurs whenever the initiator detects duplicate messages before step (3), e.g. in
case 3.
3. One or more attackers have gained the security secret but the honest agent has
detected the attack (restart).
4. One or more attackers have gained the security secret, the honest agent has de-
tected the attack and has also acquired new knowledge on the identity of the
attacker (retaliate and restart).
5. One or more attackers have gained the security secret but the attack has not been
detected (security failure).
During a protocol run, the proprietary datasets evolve in different ways according to
the roles and the knowledge of the agents. The interpretation of messages – and along
with it the behavior – can vary, both according to prior knowledge on the system and
according to strategic considerations.
In Table 10, we show the effects of introducing a guardian G for SRA3P, config-
ured as one of the competitive attackers described in the case study. Compared to the
guardian for BME (see Section 4), a guardian for SRA3P appears to be less effective,
in that it prevents E from successfully carrying out his attack in fewer cases. However,
it must be noted that SRA3P is a much harder protocol to defend because it does not
entail that attacker success is mutually exclusive. Remarkably, G can be effective even
when he is not aware of E’s presence. The effectiveness of a guardian for SRA3P is
comparable to the case of BME, if honest agents can detect and mount retaliatory at-
tacks whenever attackers guess the wrong secret and use it to communicate with honest
agents.
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canSee Case 2 Case 3 Cases 1+4,5,6 Cases 4,5,6
E ∈AttendG G ∈AttendE
{E,G} ∼+ √ ∼
{G}
√ √ √ √
{E} ∼+ √ ∼
Table 10: Effects of introducing a guardian G for SRA3P when attacker E is active. G operates
according to the same strategy as the attackers in the case study. G’s active interference results in
E failing to acquire the secret (√), in being sometimes uncertain (∼) or in being always uncertain
(∼+).
C Extended tables for SRA3P
In this appendix, we present a detailed view of the outcome of an attack carried out
against SRA3P and involving only the non-collaborative attackers E1 and E2. Refer to
Table 8 for a definition of SRA3P and attacker behavior against SRA3P and to Table 9
for attack traces and cases.
For each case, we report the following subcases (columns):
• attacker E1 is using the classical attack and stops spying on the network after
receiving the first message that he can interpret as M.
• attacker E1 continues to spy on the network even after receiving the first message
that can be interpreted as M, with all possible values of the set canSee() for A’s
response in step (3). If an attacker is not in canSee, he fails regardless of the
number of fake messages dispatched.
For each attacker role, we describe:
• (Attack) which attack has been used (classical or strong) or if there has been a
switch from the classical to the strong attack during the protocol run (Cl → Str).
• (Detection) the ability to acquire further information on competitors. Possible
values are: none performed (none); none possible, because the agent already
has a correct understanding of the situation (none (c)); in-protocol detection, by
spying the attack trace when no competitor is known ((in) trace); post-protocol
detection, by realizing that more than one candidate M has been spied and an
unknown competitor is responsible for the uncertainty ((post) uncertainty) – with
the variant (post ∃) uncertainty to also signal that the identifier of the previously
unknown competitor is not in Attend.
• (Messages) the set of messages that can be interpreted as M. M! indicates that
only M has been spied; M+ indicates that more than one message, including M,
has been spied; M f ake that only fake messages have been spied; none, to indicate
that no message has been spied during the protocol run.
• (Result) the result of the protocol run. Possible results are: full failure (the
attacker does not acquire M and takes a fake message for the secret), failure (the
attacker does not acquire M and realizes it), uncertainty (the attacker acquires
the secret M along with other fake messages), success (the attacker knows M
without uncertainty), dominance (the attacker succeeds and all his competitors
fully fail).
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For honest agents we show only the result: either security failure or attack detection
through duplicate messages.
The last two rows in each table show the outcomes when a guardian G is introduced
along with a single (competitive) attacker E . GE1 plays the role of E1 against E playing
E2 and GE2 plays the role of E2 against E1. Similarly to attackers, we show for G
the possible conclusions that can be drawn on attacker identity and the actual security.
Security can be: compromised, if E known M with certainty; uncertain E, if E known
M but cannot identify it with certainty; restored, if E fails to acquire M; enforced, if
thanks to G being present, flags were raised for A that allow A to detect an ongoing
attack and abort the protocol to protect M.
Case 1 E1 stops E1 continues and canSee(M∗) =
Agent Feature {E1,E2} {E1} {E2}
E1 Attack Classical Classical Classical Classical
Detection none (post) uncertainty (post) uncertainty none
Messages M f ake M+ M+ M f ake
Result full failure uncertainty uncertainty full failure
E2 Attack Cl → Str Cl → Str Cl → Str Cl → Str
Detection (in) trace (in) trace (in) trace (in) trace
Messages M! M! none M!
Result dominance success failure dominance
A Result failure failure failure failure
GE1 Detection none (post) label (post) label none
Security compromised compromised restored compromised
GE2 Detection (in) label (in) label (in) label (in) label
Security restored uncertain E uncertain E restored
Table 11: Overall SRA3P results, detailed view of case 1: E1 and E2 know each other as honest.
If E1 is no longer listening on the network, only E2 can place an erase request in step (3) and
thus can acquire the message M∗ with certainty. If the competitor E1 continues to eavesdrop, the
dominant intruder can fail to acquire M∗ whenever E2 6∈ canSee. If, on the other hand, it is the
attacker at disadvantage (E1) that is not in canSee, then E1 fails regardless of the number of fake
messages.
Case 2 E1 stops canSee(M∗) =
Agent Feature {E1,E2} {E1} {E2}
E1 Attack – Strong Strong Strong
Detection – none (c) none (c) none (c)
Messages – M+ M+ M f ake
Result – uncertainty uncertainty full failure
E2 Attack – Strong Strong Strong
Detection – none (c) none (c) none (c)
Messages – M+ M f ake M+
Result – uncertainty full failure uncertainty
A Result – failure failure failure
GE1 Detection – none (c) none (c) none (c)
Security – uncertain E restored uncertain E
GE2 Detection – none (c) none (c) none (c)
Security – uncertain E uncertain E restored
Table 12: Overall SRA3P results, detailed view of case 2: E1 and E2 know each other as dishon-
est.
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Case 3 –
Agent Feature
E1 Attack Classical
Detection (post, ∃) failure
Messages none
Result failure
E2 Attack Classical
Detection (post, ∃) failure
Messages none
Result failure
A Result detection (duplicates)
GE1 Detection (post) ∃
Security enforced
GE2 Detection (post) ∃
Security enforced
Table 13: Overall SRA3P results, detailed view of case 3: E1 and E2 are unaware of each other.
Case 4A: E1 starts the attack
Case 4B: E2 starts the attack
E1 stops canSee(M∗) =
Agent Feature {E1,E2} {E1} {E2}
E1 Attack Classical Classical Classical Classical
Detection none (post ∃) uncertainty (post ∃) uncertainty none
Messages M f ake M+ M+ M f ake
Result full failure uncertainty uncertainty full failure
E2 Attack Cl → Str Cl → Str Cl → Str Cl → Str
Detection (in) trace (in) trace (in) trace (in) trace
Messages M! M! none M!
Result dominance success failure dominance
A Result failure failure failure failure
GE1 Detection none post (∃) post (∃) none
Security compromised compromised restored compromised
GE2 Detection (in) label (in) label (in) label (in) label
Security restored uncertain E uncertain E restored
Table 14: Overall SRA3P results, detailed view of case 4: E2 knows E1 as honest.
Case 5A: E1 starts the attack
Case 5B: E2 starts the attack
E1 stops canSee(M∗) =
Agent Feature {E1,E2} {E1} {E2}
E1 Attack Classical Classical Classical Classical
Detection none (post ∃) uncertainty (post ∃) uncertainty none
Messages M f ake M+ M+ M f ake
Result full failure uncertainty uncertainty full failure
E2 Attack Strong Strong Strong Strong
Detection none (c) none (c) none (c) none (c)
Messages M! M! none M!
Result dominance success failure dominance
A Result failure failure failure failure
GE1 Detection none post (∃) post (∃) none
Security compromised compromised restored compromised
GE2 Detection none (c) none (c) none (c) none (c)
Security restored uncertain E uncertain E restored
Table 15: Overall SRA3P results, detailed view of case 5: E2 knows E1 as dishonest.
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Case 6A: E1 starts the attack
Case 6B: E2 starts the attack
E1 stops canSee(M∗) =
Agent Feature {E1,E2} {E1} {E2}
E1 Attack Classical Classical Classical Classical
Detection none (post ∃) uncertainty (post ∃) uncertainty none
Messages M f ake M+ M+ M f ake
Result full failure uncertainty uncertainty full failure
E2 Attack Strong Strong Strong Strong
Detection (in) label (in) label (in) label (in) label
Messages M! M! none M!
Result dominance success failure dominance
A Result failure failure failure failure
GE1 Detection none post (∃) post (∃) none
Security compromised compromised restored compromised
GE2 Detection (in) label (in) label (in) label (in) label
Security restored uncertain E uncertain E restored
Table 16: Overall SRA3P results, detailed view of case 6: E2 knows E1 but has not yet estab-
lished a belief on E1’s honesty.
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